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ANTI-WAR & ANTI-GITMO: MILITARY EXPRESSION AND THE DILEMMA 
OF LICENSED PROFESSIONALS IN UNIFORM  
Michael J. Lebowitz* 
Military justice is unique not only for its separate legal code, but 
also for its impact on licensed professionals in uniform. Physicians and 
lawyers are ethically bound by their licensing requirements. But put a mili-
tary uniform on these professionals, and they are subject to punitive action 
under the respective codes of their nation‟s armed forces. For a uniformed 
professional facing a desire to speak out against war or military policy, 
regulations governing “military expression” can be a “career killer.” This 
article examines the unique dilemma facing licensed professionals who are 
caught up in a trifecta of free-speech restrictions, personal beliefs and ethi-
cal licensing requirements. Cases originating in the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Guantánamo Bay highlight the legal and career ramifica-
tions affecting those who could not legally balance the military expression 
trifecta. This article further considers potential remedies to assist uniformed 
licensed professionals who experience this “crisis of conscience.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Much has been made of medical professionals and lawyers who as-
sisted in controversial post-9/11 practices such as harsh interrogations and 
combat operations.1 As such, this paper instead focuses on those licensed 
  
 *  J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law; B.A., Kent State University. 
Currently serving as a war crimes prosecutor in the Office of Military Commissions. Also 
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uniformed professionals who personally oppose the actions of their military 
employers. Some would call these doctors and lawyers ―anti-war.‖2 And, it 
is these professionals who—perhaps more than anyone else in uniform—are 
caught between a trifecta of licensed ethical requirements, rules limiting 
servicemember military expression, and their own consciences.3 This paper 
analyzes the military expression rules surrounding licensed professionals in 
uniform, and the resulting dilemma such requirements create relating to 
those who wish to act on their personal beliefs. 
In addition, the military commissions process at Guántanamo Bay, 
Cuba (GTMO) is noteworthy in this context because it serves as a sort of 
laboratory for legal professionals as they navigate the military expression 
rules.4 In a number of instances, military prosecutors, defense attorneys, and 
  
serving as litigation attorney and military defense counsel in private practice, handling nu-
merous military expression cases. Previously served as chief legal assistance attorney and 
military defense counsel in the Virginia Army National Guard as part of the U.S. Army 
Judge Advocate General‘s Corps. Deployed to Iraq in 2005–2006 as a paratrooper with the 
Pathfinder Company of the 101st Airborne Division. The author would like to thank Chuck 
Zelnis (USMC Ret.), prosecutor, Office of Military Commissions, for his guidance and in-
sight in preparing this article. 
1
 See, e.g., Michael L. Kramer & Michael N. Schmitt, Lawyers on Horseback? Thoughts on 
Judge Advocates and Civil-Military Relations, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1407, 1418 & n.58 
(2008)(citing Memoranda From Air Force Deputy Judge Advocate General Major General 
Jack L. Rives, Navy Judge Advocate General Rear Admiral Michael F. Lohr, Army Judge 
Advocate General Major General Thomas J. Romig, and Staff Judge Advocate to the Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps Brigadier General Kevin M. Sandkuhler to the General Coun-
sel of the Air Force Mary Walker Regarding Recommendations of the Working Group to 
Assess the Legal, Policy, and Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held 
by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (Feb. to Mar. 2003) in THE TORTURE 
DEBATE IN AMERICA 377–91 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2005)). 
 2 See Anti-War Definition, Cambridge Advanced Learner‘s Dictionary, http://dictionary. 
cambridge.org/dictionary/british/anti-war (last visited Mar. 13, 2011) (defining ―anti-war‖ as 
―opposed to a particular war or to all wars‖). 
 3 See generally CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS (Am. Med. Ass‘n 2010); MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Am. Bar Ass‘n 2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/model
_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents.html. The U.S. military‘s Uniform Code 
of Military Justice also provides a numbers of punitive charges limiting military expression. 
See 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2006) (contempt toward officials); 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2006) (failure to 
obey lawful orders or regulations); 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2006)(conduct that endangers military 
discipline or could bring the military into disrepute); see also Ellen Yaroshefsky, Military 
Lawyering at the Edge of the Rule of Law at Guantanamo: Should Lawyers be Permitted to 
Violate the Law, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 574–79 (2007) (describing the ―crisis of con-
science‖ that compelled a military lawyer opposed to various practices at Guántanamo Bay 
Naval Station to smuggle classified information to a human rights organization). 
 4 See generally Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Ex-
ecutive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661, n.155 (2009) (detailing numerous examples 
of military attorneys at GTMO who began expressing opposition to executive branch poli-
cies); see also Yaroshefsky, supra note 3. 
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supposedly neutral Judge Advocates have engaged in a messy literal war of 
words.5 This scripted ―war‖ relates specifically to attacks and counter-
attacks emanating from personal beliefs that are typically frowned upon 
under military regulations.6 Among the carnage relating to action derived 
from personal belief, one experienced military attorney was sent to prison at 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, others resigned in protest, careers were stunted 
or ended, and others were threatened with sanctions.7 An odd result then 
seemingly developed where military prosecutors found themselves con-
strained in their speech well beyond typical rules outside of GTMO, while 
military defense lawyers continued to get away with speech activity that 
runs counter to military regulation and practice.8 
Part II of this paper analyzes the three elements that make up the 
unique dilemma and additional pressures facing those licensed professionals 
in uniform who experience a ―crisis of conscience.‖ Part III focuses on the 
veritable military expression laboratory that has developed among some 
uniformed attorneys participating in the detainee and military commissions 
process at Guántanamo Bay, Cuba. Part IV offers some remedies that can be 
used to assist both the licensed professionals who find themselves personal-
ly conflicted and potential whistleblowers. 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE MILITARY EXPRESSION TRIFECTA 
Forms of military expression limitations are applicable to most 
Western armed forces.9 This is not to say that these servicemembers do not 
have free speech rights, as they certainly do.
10
 American soldiers, sailors, 
marines, and airmen undoubtedly retain First Amendment rights, for exam-
ple, as do U.K. troops under Article 10 of the European Convention of Hu-
  
 5 See Landau, supra note 4. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id.  
 8 See, e.g., DEP‘T OF DEFENSE, REGULATION FOR TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION (2007). 
 9 See generally U.S. v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442 (2008) (prosecuting a soldier under Article 
134 for wrongfully advocating anti-government and disloyal statements); Parker v. Levy, 
417 U.S. 733 (1974) (finding a captain‘s conduct of urging other personnel to refuse to obey 
orders unprotected by the Constitution); U.S. v. Priest, 45 C.M.R. 338 (1972) (affirming the 
discharge of a servicemember for disloyal statements); U.S. v. Blair, 67 M.J. 566 (2008) 
(upholding conviction of servicemember who promoted the Ku Klux Klan); U.S. v. Ogren, 
54 M.J. 481 (2001) (upholding conviction of military officer under the UCMJ who said he 
wanted to harm the President); see also U.S. DEP‘T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND 
POLICY (2008) [hereinafter AR 600-20]. 
 10 See, e.g., U.S. v. Brown, 45 M.J. 389, 395 (1996) (finding that both military service-
members and civilians have the right to criticize the government and to express ideas to 
influence the body politic); see also Maj. Michael C. Friess, A Specialized Society: Speech 
Offenses in the Military, ARMY LAW., Sept. 2009, at 18 (noting that men and women in uni-
form are not immune to trends in public opinion, and may speak out about their beliefs). 
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man Rights.11 In fact, the military expression regulations are theoretically 
written and interpreted equally among servicemembers.12 Saying that, how-
ever, an additional charge of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentle-
man applies specifically to commissioned officers as opposed to enlisted 
servicemembers.13 This officer-specific rule is in place mostly because of 
the higher standard and level of leadership responsibility bestowed upon 
commissioned officers.14 In addition, it should be noted that licensed profes-
sionals in uniform—to include doctors, lawyers, and chaplains—generally 
serve in such capacities as officers.15 As such, licensed professionals are 
essentially treated under the same military expression rules as their fellow 
officers regardless of duty position.16 
In terms of speech, whistleblower rules exist to assist servicememb-
ers in providing a conduit to express their concerns to investigators.17 For 
example, the Military Whistleblower Protection Act in the United States is 
designed to protect servicemembers from retaliation after reporting what the 
servicemember perceives to be wrongdoing.18 The report does not have to 
be per se wrongful, as the servicemember is protected only if he or she is 
issuing the report out of a good faith, reasonable belief.19 Like its federal 
whistleblower counterpart, the military version is very specific on items 
relating to whom the report can be made, timelines, and investigatory 
  
 11 See Brown, 45 M.J. at 395 (while the military servicemembers have First Amendment 
rights, the right to free speech is not absolute); Friess, supra note 10, at 19 (service members 
rights to free speech are less extensive than civilian rights to free speech); see European 
Convention on Human Rights, art. 10, ¶2, Apr. 11, 1952, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998), available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CL=ENG. 
 12 But see supra text accompanying note 3. While UCMJ punitive charges do not contain 
language differentiating among various military professions, the USC punishes commis-
sioned officers for conduct unbecoming of an officer. 
 13 See Sarah Rosen, Be All That You Can Be? An Analysis of and Proposed Alternative to 
Military Speech Regulations, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 875, 882 (2010); see also U.S. v. Diaz, 
69 M.J. 127, 137 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (upholding conviction for conduct unbecoming an officer 
under UCMJ, art. 133). 
 14 See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (citing Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 
91 (1953) (officers hold a particular position of responsibility and command that is occa-
sioned by the ―special trust and confidence in [their] patriotism, valor, fidelity and abilities‖). 
 15 See, e.g., infra note 67. 
 16 See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 17 Military Whistleblower Protection Act 10 U.S.C.A § 1034 (West 2008); but see Ver-
beck v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 47, 61–62 (2009). Both Military Whistleblower Protection 
Act and federal Whistleblower Protection Act did not apply to nurse practitioner in the Pub-
lic Health Services‘ Commissioned Corps because of statutes do not apply to commissioned 
officers. 
 18 See supra text accompanying note 17.  
 19 See Military Whistleblower Protection Act, supra note 17 (requiring ―reasonable be-
lief‖). 
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process.20 Specifically, military whistleblowers can report perceived wrong-
doing to any member of Congress, a commander, and investigator general.21 
Importantly, neither the media nor human rights organizations are cov-
ered.22 
A.  Military Expression Limitations 
The rules and regulations pertaining to military expression general-
ly limit the level of personal viewpoints and political activities that can be 
espoused under the perception of official capacity.23 These limitations have 
been carved out for servicemembers specifically due to the ―specialized 
society‖ of the military that places special emphasis on morale and good 
order and discipline.24 It is this niche within the military mission that justi-
fies criminal charges against soldiers who speak or act upon their personal 
beliefs.25 In fact, these criminal charges differentiate military expression 
rules from limitations on certain activities by government employees.26 
In the United States, both the Supreme Court and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) have consistently upheld such limita-
tions.27 In Europe, Article 10 (2) of the European Convention of Human 
Rights provides governments with the ability to regulate freedom of expres-
sion for items such as national security, protection of health or morals, and 
prevention of disorder or crime.28 With respect to licensed professionals in 
uniform, the underlying punitive laws do not distinguish between service-
members who do and do not require licenses to fulfill their missions.29 
B.  Personal Beliefs 
All officers certainly are not mindless robots, which means that they 
do weigh issues of politics and military within their own minds on a daily 
basis.30 Servicemembers, for example, can use their personal judgment to 
  
 20 See supra text accompanying note 17 (neither statute applies to commissioned officers). 
 21 See Military Whistleblower Protection Act, supra note 17. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 24 See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Friess, supra note 10, at 18.  
 25 Friess, supra note 10, at 19. 
 26 5 U.S.C. § 1501 (1988) (Government employees are generally limited in engaging in 
certain political activities, unlike service members who are subject to punitive articles under 
the UCMJ. Government employees under the Hatch Act are generally subject to dismissal.). 
 27 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 28 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 11. 
 29 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 30 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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refuse to commit what they deem to be an unlawful order.31 This personal 
conscience element, however, certainly does not absolve servicemembers 
from repercussions as most ―soldiers of conscience‖ have been punished for 
―failure to obey a lawful order.‖32 
Typical examples pertain to servicemembers who refuse to deploy 
to combat zones. These individuals often base their publicly stated beliefs 
on the notion that participating in what they claim to be an unlawful war 
effectively renders such participation unlawful.33 Licensed professionals on 
occasion have joined numerous other officers and enlisted soldiers in mak-
ing this argument.34 
A good example is the case of Flight Lieutenant Malcolm Kendall-
Smith, a medical doctor in the U.K. Royal Air Force.35 In 2005, Kendall-
Smith refused to serve in his medical capacity in Basra, Iraq.36 His rationale 
was that to deploy would be tantamount to an ―act of aggression‖ in a mili-
tary operation that he already publicly denounced as akin to a Nazi war 
crime.37 Kendall-Smith ultimately was court-martialed and jailed on charges 
relating to his refusal to deploy, as well as periphery charges of failure to 
obey a lawful order.38 During the trial, the doctor passionately articulated 
his personal dilemma between the trifecta of his military duty, personal be-
liefs and medical profession. ―I would wish to restate that I have two great 
  
 31 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2006) (penalizing only disobedience of lawfully issued or-
ders). 
 32 United States v. Diaz, 69 M.J. 127, 128–30 (2010) (charging Diaz with violating a law-
ful general order when he gave classified information about Guántanamo Bay detainees to an 
attorney working for the Center for Constitutional Rights); See also United States v. Huet-
Vaugh, 43 M.J. 105, 107 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (Captain Huet-Vaugh‘s intent was ―to expose what 
she felt was impending war crimes in the Persian Gulf and to expose that to the American 
people, to the Congress, to the United Nations, talk shows, et cetera, et cetera. That was her 
intent; that was the reason why this lady actually went AWOL.‖); United States v. Webster, 
65 M.J. 936, 937 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2008) (Webster, a convert to Islam, contended he ―did 
not freely plead guilty [to a bad-conduct discharge] because the Islamic scholars he consulted 
prohibited him from serving in Iraq where he could kill fellow Muslims.‖); Alexandra Top-
ping, A British Soldier‟s Story: People Are Suffering, I couldn‟t Go Back, GUARDIAN U.K., 
July 30, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/jul/30/afghanistan-british-
soldier-joe-glenton; RAF Doctor Jailed Over Iraq Refusal, GUARDIAN U.K., Apr. 13, 2006, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/apr/13/military.iraq?INTCMP=SRCH. 
 33 See Huet-Vaugh, 43 M.J. 105, 107 (C.A.A.F. 1995); Alexandra Topping, A British 
Soldier‟s Story: People Are Suffering, I couldn‟t Go Back, GUARDIAN U.K., July 30, 2009, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/jul/30/afghanistan-british-soldier- 
joe-glenton; RAF Doctor Jailed Over Iraq Refusal, supra note 32. 
 34 See RAF Doctor Jailed Over Iraq Refusal, supra note 32. 
 35 Jail for Iraq Refusal RAF Doctor, BBC NEWS, Apr. 13, 2006, available at http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/apr/13/military.iraq?INTCMP=SRCH. 
 36 Id. 
 37 See RAF Doctor Jailed Over Iraq Refusal, supra note 32.  
 38 Id. 
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loves in life, medicine and the Royal Air Force,‖ Kendall-Smith said. ―To 
take the decision that I did caused me great sadness, but I feel I had no other 
choice.‖39 
In this case, Kendall-Smith was treated like most other war resisters 
who made their cases public.40 The court‘s presiding officer informed the 
doctor that the court-martial panel did in fact believe he was acting on moral 
grounds.41 The officer then added that Kendall-Smith displayed an ―amaz-
ing arrogance‖ in how he proceeded to act upon his personal beliefs.42 ―Ob-
edience of orders is at the heart of any disciplined force,‖ the court stated.43 
―Refusal to obey orders means that the force is not a disciplined force but a 
disorganized rabble. Those who wear the Queen‘s uniform cannot pick and 
choose which orders they will obey. Those who seek to do so must face the 
serious consequences.‖44 
In the United States, Terrence Lakin represents another medical 
doctor who publicly refused to deploy on the basis that his personal beliefs 
trumped duty to follow orders.45 Faced with a deployment to Afghanistan to 
serve in a medical capacity, the seventeen-year veteran instead took his per-
sonal beliefs to online video sites such as YouTube, and then to the media.46 
As a so-called ―birther,‖ Lakin argued that his deployment orders were un-
lawful because of his belief that President Barack Obama was not Constitu-
tionally eligible to be commander-in-chief.47 During Lakin‘s court-martial, 
military prosecutors called the doctor out on using the deployment as a po-
litical ploy by going to great lengths to create a spectacle in order to call 
into question Obama‘s country of birth publicly.48 Unlike Kendall-Smith 
who maintained his political stance, Lakin blamed previous legal counsel 
and became repentant by offering to deploy immediately.49 ―I don‘t want it 
to end this way,‖ he told the court, ―I want to continue to serve.‖50 Lakin 
was jailed for six months and dismissed from the military on charges of 
  
 39 See Jail for Iraq Refusal RAF Doctor, supra note 35.  
 40 See supra note 32.  
 41 See RAF Doctor Jailed Over Iraq Refusal, supra note 32.  
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See, e.g., Judge Removes „Birther‟ Elements from Army Doc‟s Court Martial, CNN 
(Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/09/02/birther.court.martial/index.html; 
see also Jessica Gresko, Military Jury: Prison, Dismissal for Army Birther, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Dec. 16, 2010, available at http://www.wtopnews.com/?nid=715&sid=2200202. 
 46 Gresko, supra note 45. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
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failure to obey a lawful order, as well as missing movement to his deploy-
ment.51 
The precedent for war resisters is such that the legal arguments sur-
rounding specialized professional licenses are largely irrelevant. In the 
1990s, Army Reservist Yolanda Huet-Vaughn publicly cited her personal 
and ethical duties as a medical doctor in her public refusal to deploy in sup-
port of Operation Desert Shield. Huet-Vaughn, like Lakin and the United 
Kingdom‘s Kendall-Smith during the post-9/11 conflicts, ultimately re-
ceived a similar fate as many other non-licensed servicemembers who pub-
licly refused to deploy. 
In support of her court-martial defense, Huet-Vaughn submitted 
evidence describing herself as a ―lady of conscience‖ and demonstrating her 
legitimate personal belief that deserting her unit was necessary to avoid the 
perceived greater evil of participating in a war crime.52 This ―Nuremburg 
Defense‖—as she called it—was aimed at articulating her contention that 
she should be exonerated for seeking to avoid obeying what she deemed to 
be an unlawful order.53 However, as was the case with Lakin and the many 
other non-licensed servicemembers, the court deemed this defense irrelevant 
to the overarching charge of failure to obey a lawful order, 
AWOL/desertion and missing movement.54 In Huet-Vaughn‘s case, the mil-
itary appeals court affirmed that in order to present the Nuremberg Defense, 
an accused must present evidence that he or she had been individually or-
dered to commit acts that would be actual war crimes.55 But, even in this 
case, the chief judge dissented in part on the grounds that:  
[I]t was error for the military judge to prevent Captain (CPT) Huet-
Vaughn from explaining her state of mind at the time she left her unit . . . 
Under our case law CPT Huet-Vaughn‘s mental processes were relevant to 
determine whether she had an intent to avoid hazardous duty or shirk im-
portant service as required by Article 85, Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice.
56
 
  
 51 Id. 
 52 United States v. Huet-Vaughn, 43 M.J. 105, 107 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (stating that during 
opening statements defense counsel told the court ―[The defendant] is a lady of con-
science.‖). 
 53 Id. at 110. 
 54 See id. at 112–17. 
 55 See id. at 114. 
 56 See id. at 116 (―[A]n accused cannot be denied every opportunity to present evidence at 
the trial to negate the existence of every element of the offense charged.‖) (quoting United 
States v. Huff, 22 CMR 37, 40 (1956)); see also United States v. Apple, 10 C.M.R. 90, 92 
(1953) (allowing defendant to introduce testimony that he did not intentionally avoid hazard-
ous duty); see also United States v. McIntyre, 10 C.M.R. 57, 60 (1953) (allowing alternative 
evidence to prove different types of intent in a charge of intentional avoidance of hazardous 
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Still, the precedent was generally maintained where typical war re-
sisters are ultimately required to base their defense solely on the underlying 
charges, regardless of professional license or personal belief.57 But as we 
see in United States v. Diaz, decided in 2010, the specific charge of conduct 
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman was interpreted to allow evidence to 
state of mind relating to the circumstances of why the particular military 
lawyer acted in such a manner.58 
C.  Professional Ethical Requirements 
The final element of the military expression trifecta pertains to the 
additional layer of requirements that make the licensed professional in uni-
form unique from other servicemembers. All officers—including doctors 
and lawyers—are required to take an oath prior to commissioning.59 In the 
United States, this oath subscribes fealty to the Constitution and agreement 
to obey orders emanating from the higher ranks.60 In the United Kingdom, 
most servicemembers swear an oath to the Crown, as well as to those high-
er-ranking officers.61 But licensed professionals also swear a second oath. 
Lawyers and doctors, upon admission to their respective bar associations or 
boards, also typically swear oaths to their professions and consequently are 
governed by an accredited professional association.62 These oaths primarily 
  
duty); see also United States v. Cline, 9 C.M.R. 41, 43 (1953) (considering defendant‘s tes-
timony of an alternative motive for his actions); see generally United States v. Shull, 2 
C.M.R. 83 (1952) (considering evidence of intents other than to avoid hazardous duty as 
relevant to disprove the required intent element of desertion); see also United States v. Ka-
bat, 797 F.2d 580, 589 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding no error where a trial judge did not specifical-
ly instruct the jury on motive evidence admitted at trial to negate specific intent), cert. de-
nied, 481 U.S. 1030, 107 S.Ct. 1958 (1987). 
 57 See United States v. Rockwood, 48 M.J. 501, 501 (1998) (holding that a counter-
intelligence officer‘s personal interpretation of the President‘s command did not create a 
―legal duty‖ upon which the defendant could base an affirmative defense regarding a per-
ceived duty to inspect the National Penitentiary of Haiti during Operation Uphold Democra-
cy). 
 58 United States v. Diaz, 69 M.J. 127, 136 (―Evidence of honorable motive may inform the 
factfinder‘s judgment as to whether conduct is unbecoming an officer.‖). 
 59 See Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Keskel, The Oath of Office: A historical Guide to 
Moral Leadership, XVI AIR & SPACE POWER J. 47, 47 (Winter 2002) (discussing the ―nu-
merous oaths‖ that can be found in our nation). 
 60 See id. at 48–49 (discussing the history of oaths in relation to the Constitution and the 
military). 
 61 See id. at 56, n.25 (stating that many countries, such as Great Britain, require officers to 
take an oath of allegiance to a king or head of state). 
 62 See, e.g., Lawyers Oath, LA. SUP. CT. COMM. ON BAR ADMISSIONS, http://www.lascba. 
org/lawyers_oath.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2011); Lawyers Oath, STATE BAR OF MICH., 
http://www.michbar.org/generalinfo/lawyersoath.cfm (last visited Mar. 13, 2011); Kaji Sri-
tharan et al., Medical Oaths and Declarations, 323 BRIT. MED. J. 1440, 1440 (2001), availa-
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relate to the rigorous ethical duties of the profession. As such, doctors and 
lawyers are bound by the government-sanctioned ethical requirements in 
much the same way as the binding force of the military oath.63 The primary 
difference, however, is that violation of the professional oath can result in 
loss of license, while violations of the military duty may lead to loss of 
freedom. 
In Huet-Vaughn‘s case, she lost her freedom through the military 
and later was censured and fined from her medical licensing authority due 
to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ ) conviction.64 In affirming 
the decision, the Kansas Supreme Court agreed with the licensing board that 
the ―military conviction was a conviction for which punishment is compa-
rable to that for a felony conviction by the State of Kansas and that plaintiff 
was subject to discipline under the Kansas Healing Arts Act.‖65 It is impor-
tant to note that both the licensing authority and the court focused on the 
court martial conviction as opposed to the underlying motives.66 
Based on the dual oaths, a dilemma occasionally arises when a li-
censed professional in uniform realizes that he or she is personally opposed 
to the decision-making within the military and civilian hierarchy. This is 
where the licensed professional differs from other servicemembers who 
only wrestle with the military expression rules and their personal convic-
tions. For example, some interpret the broad social responsibility statements 
contained within the Code of Ethics of the American Medical Association 
as a mandate to conduct social action.67 Similar arguments were made in 
reference to the oath taken by medical school graduates in the former Soviet 
Union.68 In fact, the medical profession is conflicted in its own right on the 
  
ble at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1121898/pdf/1440.pdf/ (stating that 98 
percent of American medical school graduates and nearly half of British graduates swear an 
oath.); Louis Lasagna, The Hippocratic Oath: Modern Version, NOVA, http://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/nova/doctors/oath_modern.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
 63 See, e.g., Robert Shaffer, New Medical Oath No Cue for Critics, FOX NEWS (Mar. 1, 
2002), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,46848,00.html (discussing medicine‘s medical 
oath).  
 64 Huet-Vaughn v. Kan. State Bd. of Healing Arts, 978 P.2d 896 (Kan. 1999), available at 
http://www.kscourts.org/cases-and-opinions/opinions/supct/1999/19990416/80362.htm. 
 65 Id. at 897. 
 66 See id. 
 67 CHARLES B. STROZIER & MICHAEL FLYNN, GENOCIDE, WAR, AND HUMAN SURVIVAL 194 
(1998) (arguing that the Hippocratic Oath is less inclined toward political activism than the 
Code of Ethics.). 
 68 See id.; see also Victor W. Sidel & Barry S. Levy, Physician-Soldier: A Moral Dilem-
ma, in 1 MILITARY MEDICAL ETHICS 293–312 (2003), available at http://www.bordeninstitute 
.army.mil/published_volumes/ethicsVol1/Ethics-ch-11.pdf (arguing that being a military 
physician possesses inherent moral irresponsibility).  
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reconciliation between physicians acting under the guise of medical neutral-
ity and physicians serving as ―quasi-human rights police.‖69 
The military structure often seeks to alleviate some of the concerns 
in an apparent effort to support medical neutrality. For example, the U.S. 
military prohibits its doctors from assuming positions of command.70 French 
military doctors are preferably trained in special military medical schools 
instead of coming into the service after already receiving the vast amount of 
medical training.71 The idea is that military doctors are separate from many 
of the daily functions of the military so that these medical officers can focus 
on their craft.72 
However, as the cases of Huet-Vaughn, Kendall-Smith, and Lakin 
demonstrate, military physicians have acted against the physician neutral 
aspect of their professions based on strong personal political beliefs. Per-
haps the case of a medical officer choosing action against the military based 
on personal political belief is best highlighted in Parker v. Levy.73 In this 
instance, Howard Levy was an Army doctor tasked with medical duties 
pertaining to soldiers preparing to deploy in support of the Vietnam War.74 
Unlike the above-named contemporaries, Levy took his viewpoints straight 
to the servicemembers within his medical purview.75 His activities included 
encouraging servicemembers to resist deployment, as well as claiming that 
special forces personnel were murderers and liars.76 Levy was sentenced to 
three years in prison for failure to obey a lawful order and conduct unbe-
coming an officer and a gentleman.77 In affirming the conviction, Chief 
  
 69 Justin M. List, Medical Neutrality and Political Activism:Physicians‟ Roles in Conflict 
Situations, in PHYSICIANS AT WAR: THE DUAL-LOYALTIES CHALLENGE 237, 246 (Fritz Allhoff 
ed., 2008). 
 70 See, e.g., U.S. DEP‘T OF ARMY, REG. 40–1, COMPOSITION, MISSION, AND FUNCTIONS OF 
THE ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, ¶ 2–3b (1983), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA403543 (medical, veterinary, 
and dental officers are prohibited from assignment to other duties in which medical training 
is not essential.); Army Medical Specialist Corps Deployment Readiness Handbook, ARMY 
MED. SPECIALIST CORPS (Dec. 1999), http://www.pdhealth.mil/downloads/Army_MSC_ 
Handbook.pdf; U.S. DEP‘T OF ARMY, REG. 616–110, SELECTION, TRAINING, UTILIZATION, 
AND CAREER GUIDANCE FOR ARMY MEDICAL CORPS OFFICERS AS FLIGHT SURGEONS (1986), 
available at http://usasam.amedd.army.mil/dl/Flight%20Provider%20Refresher/References/ 
AR%20616-110%20FS%20selection%20training%20utilization.pdf. 
 71 Int‘l Dual-Loyalty Working Grp., Dual-Loyalty and Human Rights in Health Profes-
sional Practice: Proposed Guidelines and Institutional Mechanisms, in PHYSICIANS AT WAR: 
THE DUAL-LOYALTIES CHALLENGE 15, 34 (Fritz Allhoff ed., 2008). 
 72 Supra note 63. 
 73 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 733 (1974). 
 74 Id. at 736–37. 
 75 Id.; See also Friess, at 20. 
 76 Parker, supra note 73, at 738–39. 
 77 Id. at 736, 738. 
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Justice William Rehnquist bypassed any deference to physician require-
ments and stated the following: 
This Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specia-
lized society separate from civilian society. We have also recognized that 
the military has, again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its 
own during its long history. The differences between the military and civi-
lian communities result from the fact that ―it is the primary business of 
armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion 
arise.
78
 
The precedent of Levy certainly endures, while at the same time the 
military structure appears to favor the medical neutral system.79 But, the 
system has a different set of complexities when it comes to military law-
yers.80 Unlike military physicians, judge advocates are permitted to take 
command.81 In fact, the U.S. Marine Corps typically screens its military 
attorneys for non-legal responsibilities. As such, Marine attorneys often 
hold what is referred to as 9910 billets, which essentially create secondary 
duty positions. The result is that many licensed attorneys in the Marine 
Corps will find themselves in a more traditional command role at some 
point in a full military career. 
At the same time, however, military lawyers in both legal and non-
legal positions are like every other officer in that they are required to obey 
lawful orders and follow the letter of the law, be it UCMJ, civilian laws or 
the Law of Armed Conflict.82 This, again, is where that third element of the 
trifecta pertaining to licensing requirements becomes an additional layer of 
ethical enforcement. 
  
 78 Id. at 743. 
 79 See, e.g., supra note 63. 
 80 See generally, U.S. DEP‘T OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE (Nov. 16, 2005); 
U.S. DEP‘T OF ARMY, REG. 27-1, LEGAL SERVICES: JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICE 10 
(1996); U.S. DEP‘T OF ARMY, REG. 27-26, LEGAL SERVICES: RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS 26 (1992). 
 81 Id. 
 82 See, e.g., Martha Neil, Marine Lawyer Cleared in Haditha Case, ABA JOURNAL, Aug. 
2009. (Marine Captain Randy Stone, serving as a battalion lawyer, was initially charged for 
dereliction of duty pertaining to an investigation into a notorious murder case in Iraq. 
Charges were ultimately dropped after a lengthy pretrial hearing. ―It is clear to me that any 
error of omission or commission by Captain Stone does not warrant action under the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice,‖ Lt. Gen James Mattis said. ―I am aware of the line that sepa-
rates the merely remiss from the clearly criminal, and I do not believe that any mistakes 
Captain Stone made with respect to the incident rise to the level of criminal behavior.‖). 
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III. MILITARY EXPRESSION AT GUÁNTANAMO BAY 
When discussing the dilemma of personal political opposition 
among some military attorneys, perhaps the best practical context to analyze 
is the military commissions and detainee system that began in January 2002 
at the Guántanamo Bay Naval Station. This venue contains a relatively 
small, specialized bar of attorneys from all branches of the military.83 These 
licensed servicemembers can typically be divided into three categories—
defense counsel, prosecution, and staff judge advocates tasked with detainee 
issues and coordination. Civilian attorneys also are frequently involved as 
additional participants on the criminal and habeas corpus sides.84 
Throughout the GTMO detention facility‘s first decade, all three 
military categories demonstrated instances of uniformed attorneys blurring 
the lines between personal political conduct and military expression limita-
tions.85 Of course, it should be noted that some civilian attorneys with detai-
nee clients have in many cases run amok with political rhetoric.86 For ex-
ample, attorney Joe McMillan stated that he took a detainee military com-
mission case specifically because he had to ―stand up and participate in an 
effort to reign in‖ former President Bush.87 In another instance, habeas cor-
pus attorney David Remes was reportedly forced to resign as partner at a 
large law firm after attempting to demonstrate his version of daily ―torment‖ 
suffered by detainees by stripping down to his underpants during a press 
conference in Yemen.88 But, the focus here is on the military attorneys, be-
cause it is these licensed professionals in uniform who must reconcile the 
trifecta of personal beliefs, military expression limitations, and bar associa-
tion ethical rules.89 
  
 83 See, e.g., Charles J. Dunlap, A Tale of Two Judges: A Judge Advocate‟s Reflections on 
Judge Gonzales‟s Apologia, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 893, n.6 (2010)(noting that judge advo-
cates are designated by law). 
 84 Id. 
 85 See, e.g., Rick Rogers, Marine Lawyer has Sought Judicial Reform, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Aug. 18, 2008 (Marine Corp defense attorney publicly criticized the Guántanamo 
Bay system); Lillian Thomas, Military Attorneys Risk Careers to Criticize Practices at 
Guantanamo, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 10, 2009, available at http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/09130/968880-84.stm. 
 86 Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. & Major Linell A. Letendre, Military Lawyering 
and Professional Independence in the War on Terror: A Response to David Luban, 61 STAN. 
L. REV. 417, 435 (2008). 
 87 Paul Shukovsky, Firm‟s Unlikely Client: Bin Laden‟s Ex-Driver, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, May 27, 2008, at A1. 
 88 Dan Slater, David Remes, Who Dropped his Pants in Yemen, to Leave Covington, WALL 
ST. J. BLOG, July 21, 2008, available at: http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/07/21/david-remes-
who-dropped-his-pants-in-yemen-to-leave-covington/. 
 89 See Thomas, supra note 85. 
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A.  GTMO-Specific Factors 
Like all officers, military attorneys are bound by the rules and regu-
lations prescribed by the military and consistently upheld in court.90 Mili-
tary lawyers also are bound by layers of additional ethical regulation per-
taining to their bar memberships.91 In the case of GTMO military attorneys, 
these legal officers are required to represent their clients zealously, be it the 
detainee for defense counsel, and the government for the staff judge advo-
cates and prosecution.92 As such, being an activist attorney operating in 
support of the cause instead of the client is an additional factor to consider 
for uniformed lawyers having issues of conscience.93 
In addition to the aforementioned rules and regulations, military de-
fense counsel and prosecutors also are bound by an additional layer under 
the Regulations for Trial by Military Commission.94 These regulations state, 
among other items, that defense counsel and prosecutors are generally per-
mitted to speak to the media.95 However, prosecutors must seek permission 
to speak to the media while the defense is provided more leeway to speak.96 
One caveat is that military defense counsel must abide by ―their jurisdic-
tions‘ Rules of Professional Conduct and those of the respective military 
  
 90 Supra note 3; See also DOD DIRECTIVE 1344.10 (prohibiting types of political speech, 
to include ―contemptuous words against officeholders); MICHAEL J. DAVIDSON, A GUIDE TO 
MILITARY CRIMINAL LAW at 80 (1999)(The military considers speech to be discrediting if it 
has a tendency to bring the service into disrepute or which tends to lower it in public es-
teem.‖). 
 91 See, e.g., U.S. DEP‘T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REG. 27-1, LEGAL SERVICES: JUDGE 
ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICE 10 (1996); MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 
(1983). 
 92 Id.; see also Mazon v. Krafchick, 44 P.3d 1168, 1172 (Wash. 2006)(en 
banc)(―[D]ecisions about how to pursue a case must be based on the client‘s best interests, 
not the attorneys‘.‖); Dunlap et al., supra note 86, at 434 (―[T]he lawyer must act solely in 
the interest of his or her client and not necessarily in pursuit of other interests the attorney 
may wish to address.‖);Kramer et al., supra note 1, at 1416 (military regulations prohibit a 
―lawyer‘s personal interests‖ from interfering with the representation of the military attor-
ney‘s client). 
 93 Kramer, supra note 1, at 1416–17. 
 94 DEP‘T OF DEFENSE, supra note 8, at 9-1(3) (―The Chief Defense Counsel shall ensure 
that all personnel assigned to the Office of the Chief Defense Counsel review, and attest that 
they understand and will comply with, the M.C.A., the M.M.C., this Regulation and all Sup-
plementary Regulations and Instructions issued in accordance therewith. Furthermore, the 
Chief Defense Counsel shall regulate the conduct of detailed defense counsel as deemed 
necessary, consistent with the aforementioned legal authorities as well as subordinate instruc-
tions and regulations.‖). 
 95 Id. at 8-7, 9-7. 
 96 Id. (It should be noted that civilian prosecutors typically are limited to publicly stating 
the facts of the case, whereas defense lawyers have more leeway due to their representation 
of the individual client.). 
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departments‘ Judge Advocates General.‖97 Moreover, chapter 9-7 of the 
regulation includes ―members of the civilian defense counsel pool.‖98 The 
rules go on to state violations of professional responsibility can result in 
such action as reporting the lawyer to his or her bar association, court sanc-
tions, bar from working within the military commissions system, or punitive 
measures under the UCMJ.99 
Going by the military commissions regulations, practitioners at 
GTMO are bound by not only those particular rules, but also the ethical 
guidelines of their respective bar associations.100 Perhaps more significant is 
that the military attorneys also are commissioned officers, and consequently 
are subject to the limitations on military expression. A key issue then be-
comes how far an attorney can go when engaging in political speech.  
Certainly, one can dismiss this issue by arguing that the military 
lawyers should merely defend or prosecute their cases without engaging in 
detailed media statements. But the reality is that anything to do with the 
detention facility at GTMO is almost automatically politicized. This contro-
versy over detention and military commissions‘ legitimacy per se make 
practice at GTMO different from typical military practice under the UCMJ. 
As such, for example, defense attorneys may seek a tactical advantage for 
their clients by perpetuating myths and embellishments of harsh wrong-
doing at GTMO.101 The result is that military defense attorneys have advo-
cated for their clients while at the same time likely violated military expres-
sion limitations.102 In other words, they became activist attorneys. 
B.  Trifecta Violations 
A prime example is that of Major Dan Mori, who defended an Aus-
tralian detainee who was eventually convicted of material support to terror-
ism offenses in a military commission via plea agreement.103 In representing 
his detainee client, Mori appeared to violate at least two limitations of mili-
tary expression.104 In this case, Mori traveled to Australia on official orders 
  
 97 Id. at 9-7. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 10-1. 
100 Id. 
101 Dunlap et al., supra note 86, at 437. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 436; see also David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 1981, 2000 (2008) (describing the conduct of Maj. Dan Mori). 
104 Dunlap et al., supra note 86, at 435. 
File: Lebowitz 2 Created on:  4/17/2011 2:04:00 PM Last Printed: 5/22/2011 7:45:00 PM 
594 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. [Vol. 43 
purportedly to work on his case.105 During this trip, Mori appeared at vari-
ous events while wearing his uniform.106 At these events, Mori ―delivered . . 
. blistering public comments‖ for the purpose of ―pressuring the Australian 
government.‖107 Mori‘s verbal attacks against the process, as well as United 
States and Australian officials, have been described as vociferous and vitu-
perative by some observers.108 Meanwhile, academics and activist civilian 
attorneys who openly rail against GTMO and military commissions seized 
on Mori‘s words as simple ―zealous advocacy.‖109 But, through an objective 
lens, Mori very likely violated the military expression limitations of the 
trifecta.110 
First, Mori certainly used contemptuous language against various 
government officials. This is potentially chargeable under UCMJ, Article 
88.111 Second, Mori actively participated in a foreign political demonstra-
tion while in uniform.112 This also is potentially chargeable through military 
directives prohibiting military personnel from participating in demonstra-
tions while in foreign countries.113 While it is reasonable to believe that 
Mori was advocating for his client to a good amount of success by pressur-
ing the Australian government, Mori was conducting such advocacy in a 
manner that was in direct contradiction to his duties as a military officer.114 
In that regard, legal ethics do not automatically force the attorney to 
choose the client over other professional duties, especially when to ignore 
  
105 Ellen Yaroshefsky, Military Lawyering at the Edge of the Rule of Law at Guantanamo: 
Should Lawyers Be Permitted to Violate the Law?, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 573 
(2008)(describing Maj. Mori‘s additional actions during his investigations in Australia). 
106 Id. 
107 Luban, supra note 103, at 2015–16. 
108 Dunlap et al., supra note 86, at 436; Alexandra Lahav, Portraits of Resistance: Lawyer 
Responses to Unjust Proceedings, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 725, 738 (2010). 
109 See, e.g., Luban, supra note 103, at 2015. 
110 Dunlap et al., supra note 86, at 435 n.127, citing E-mail from Col. Morris Davis, Chief 
Prosecutor, Office of Military Comm‘ns, to Judge Susan Crawford (Mar. 13, 2007, 10:25 
EST), http://graphics.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/070313DavisEmailtoCA1.pdf [herei-
nafter E-mail from Col. Morris Davis]. In the e-mail, Col. Davis wrote that ―DoDD 1325.6 
prohibits service members from participating in demonstrations while on duty, in uniform, or 
in a foreign country‖ without any exceptions for judge advocates. Id. He referenced a photo-
graph that ―shows MAJ Mori at a demonstration in Adelaide, Australia, last August doing all 
three: in uniform (minus hat), on orders (I believe), and in a foreign country.‖ Id. 
111 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2006); Rosen, supra note 13, at 881; id. To date, there has only been 
one reported case involving prosecution for violation of article 88 of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice. See United States v. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 429 (C.M.A. 1967). 
112 Dunlap et al., supra note 86, at 436–37. 
113 See id. at 436; U.S. Dep‘t of Defense, Directive No. 1325.6, Guidelines for Handling 
Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces, Enclosure 3, § 6, at 8 
(Nov. 2009), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/132506p.pdf. 
114 Dunlap et al., supra note 86, at 436–37. 
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such military duties as Mori did was to violate the law effectively.115 This is 
important because attorneys are ethically required to advocate for their 
clients while remaining within the bounds of the law.116 In the case of Mori, 
his behavior did not lead to any sort of official sanctions while Hicks made 
statements to the court that ultimately contradicted the myths and accusa-
tions perpetuated by his attorney in Australia.117 However, Mori was reas-
signed immediately after the trial and later complained that he was passed 
over twice for promotion.118 
Additional military attorneys also appeared to take advantage of the 
leeway afforded to defense counsel in the military commissions regulation. 
For example, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Colby Vokey frequently attacked 
the system as a ―sham‖ while levying provocative claims through the me-
dia.119 Meanwhile, prosecutors in the case were not able to rebut Vokey‘s 
relatively unfettered public comments effectively. ―He has said a lot of 
things that don‘t stand up to facts,‖ a Pentagon spokesman said a few years 
after Vokey completed his work at GTMO.120 It also is noteworthy that Vo-
key reportedly coupled his rhetoric with a report under the Military Whis-
  
115 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (1983), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of
_professional_conduct.html (―A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage 
that might be realized for a client.‖). 
116 See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1333, 1348 (2009) (noting that fidelity to law is one of lawyers‘ fun-
damental obligations, along with loyalty to the client, even in litigation). 
117 Dunlap et al., supra note 86, at 436 (―Despite all of Major Mori‘s vituperative state-
ments, his client admitted his criminality to the military commission (with Major Mori at his 
side). In a plea bargain, Hicks recanted his allegations of abuse, and agreed that he had ‗nev-
er been illegally treated‘ during ‗the entire period of [his] detention by the United States at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.‘ At the hearing Major Mori also said his client ‗wants to apologize 
to Australia and to the United States.‘‖). 
118 Yaroshefsky, supra note 3, at 574. See also Raymond Bonner, Detainee‟s Marine Law-
yer Criticized, INT‘L HERALD TRIB. 3, Mar. 5, 2007 (reporting that Mori expressed concern 
about the viability of Hicks‘s defense if Mori was removed as Hicks‘s military attorney after 
he was accused of wrongdoing for his conduct in Australia). Ultimately, Mori was promoted 
and assigned to serve as a military judge. See Lawyer Says His Promotion Denied for De-
fending Terrorism Suspect, MARINE CORPS TIMES 24, Sept. 13, 2010 (―The Navy‘s court 
brief says Mori presented no evidence that board members had been critical of his efforts to 
defend terrorists and posits that board members are bound by specific instructions that bar 
them from discussing matters not contained in a candidate‘s personnel file or arising from 
third-party discussions.‖). 
119 See Rogers, supra note 85. 
120 Id. 
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tleblower Protection Act alleging harsh treatment at GTMO.121 An investi-
gation ultimately determined the allegations to be unfounded.122 
But military defense attorneys have not been the only GTMO prac-
titioners to publicly air grievances while in uniform. A handful of prosecu-
tors also have resigned due to personal objections to the military commis-
sions process.123 For example, Army Lieutenant Colonel Darrel Vandeveld 
released to the Miami Herald a scathing rebuke in 2008 of how he perceived 
his office and the overall system to be run.124 ―I am highly concerned, to the 
point that I believe I can no longer serve as a prosecutor at the Commis-
sions, about the slipshod, uncertain ‗procedure‘ for affording defense coun-
sel discovery.‖125 
Regardless of his ethical motives, Vandeveld likely violated mili-
tary regulations when he issued the unauthorized statement to the media.126 
In the end, Vandeveld‘s public allegations were dismissed as being from 
―somebody who is disappointed that his superiors did not agree with his 
recommendation in a case.‖127 
C.  Going Beyond Military Expression 
Despite the blatant affronts to the military expression aspect of the 
trifecta, there is little question that Lieutenant Commander Matthew Diaz 
escalated his personal opposition against military policy to a dangerously 
higher level of criminality.128 Diaz worked as a staff judge advocate for the 
detention operations at GTMO.129 His duties included serving as a legal 
counselor for the military, which included facilitating coordination between 
defense, prosecution, and civilian attorneys, as well as other administrative 
  
121 See Order Quiets Lawyer, AKRON BEACON J. (Ohio), Oct. 15, 2006, A15 (―A paralegal 
and a military lawyer who brought forward allegations about prisoner abuse at the Guanta-
namo Bay detention center have been ordered not to speak with the press.‖). 
122 Id. 
123 See Thomas, supra note 85; Peter Finn, Guantanamo Prosecutor Quits, Says Evidence 
Was Withheld, WASH. POST, Sep. 25, 2008, at A06; Jess Bravin, The Conscience of the Colo-
nel, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2007, at A1. 
124 Finn, supra note 123; Thomas, supra note 85. 
125 Finn, supra note 123. 
126 Dunlap et al., supra note 86, at 436. 
127 William Glaberson, Guantanamo Prosecutor is Quitting in Dispute Over Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2008, at A20. 
128 Dunlap et al., supra note 86, at 434 (Diaz‘s own defense counsel called his client‘s 
actions ―stupid, imprudent, and sneaky, if you want, about the way he sent it off . . . It was 
Diaz‘s obligation as a lawyer and an American to abide by the Constitution [even] when he 
felt the government did not.‖). 
129 See Diaz, supra note 13, at 129. 
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and legal work pertaining to the detainees.130 During his time at GTMO, 
Diaz reportedly became personally upset and agitated when U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions failed to compel the military to release a classified listing of 
all detainees.131 Finally, Diaz opted to take the matter into his own hands. 
He used his security clearance to access the classified database.132 Diaz then 
proceeded to copy the list of names into a Valentine‘s Day card.133 In the 
process, his copies also included classified coding information that was ul-
timately deemed much more sensitive than merely the names.134 Diaz then 
mailed the card to a human rights attorney at the Center for Constitutional 
Rights (CCR).135 Realizing that the information contained in the card was 
classified, the CCR attorney turned it over to authorities.136 After a brief 
investigation, Diaz was arrested and ultimately sentenced to prison.137 
The Diaz case is important because it highlights the serious ramifi-
cations for when a military attorney feels a greater compulsion to follow his 
or her personal beliefs instead of the standards for ethical or lawful conduct 
dictated by the profession.138 In fact, Diaz‘s military colleagues have added 
that this ―crisis of conscience‖ could have accomplished the same result 
without taking the route that he took.139 In retrospect, these colleagues sug-
gested that Diaz should have at a minimum avoided disclosure of the 
codes.140 But perhaps the better suggestion was that Diaz should have con-
sulted with another attorney to help identify appropriate and lawful courses 
of action.141 In fact, there are a few instances where military attorneys at 
GTMO opted to consult with legal counsel prior to engaging in questionable 
activity. When Army Lieutenant Colonel Jon Jackson was concerned that he 
was in violation of his state bar requirements by serving as merely standby 
counsel, he immediately (and with prodding from the judge) checked not 
  
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 See id. at 6. 
133 See id. at 7. 
134 See id. at 6. 
135 See USMJ and Espionage, COURT-MARTIAL.COM, http://court-martial.com/ucmj-and-
espionage/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
136 See Diaz, supra note 13, at 7. 
137 See id. at 2. 
138 See Mary Elizabeth Basile, Loyalty Testing for Attorneys: When is it Necessary and 
Who Should Decide?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1843, 1879 n.196 (2009). 
139 See Yaroshefsky, supra note 3, at 579. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. 
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only with his bar association, but also contacted a former GTMO military 
attorney who previously navigated the same issue.142 
IV. REMEDIES 
Anecdotally it is clear that licensed professionals represent only a 
small fragment of the overall military population who choose to act on their 
personal ―crisis of conscience.‖143 However, the fact that military physicians 
and lawyers do cross the line makes it a niche worthy of study. Perhaps 
more important is that as controversial policies continue to arise, military 
doctors and lawyers will always be at the forefront.144 As such, when faced 
with a personal conflict, this group of professionals—or special staff—has 
to not only weigh responsibilities as commissioned officers, but also ethical 
duties associated with law and medical licenses.145 
In the civilian world, workers are typically left with an environment 
tantamount to ―you don‘t like it, then leave.‖146 Even analysts with the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency can abandon their employment contracts, with the 
harshest penalty being federal debt collection and other civil remedies.147 
For servicemembers, however, this is quite often not an option. The reason 
is that most officers incur an obligatory amount of time in uniform.148 Sig-
  
142 Carol Rosenberg, Fired Army Lawyer: I will Defend Khadr Zealously, MIAMI HERALD, 
July 17, 2010, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/07/17/1735411/fired-army-
lawyer-i-will-defend.html#. 
143 Kramer et al., supra note 1, at 1419 (―[M]ost legal controversies emerging from the 
global war on terrorism were . . . less about conflicts between uniformed and civilian gov-
ernment attorneys than between the civilians involved.‖). 
144 Id. at 1416. 
145 Id. (Military regulations provide that a judge advocate assigned to represent an individ-
ual forms an attorney-client relationship, such that neither ―the lawyer‘s personal interests . . 
. nor the interests of third persons should affect loyalty to the individual client. No cogent 
basis exists to suggest the obligation diminishes when representing detainees. On the con-
trary, it would constitute professional misconduct for a judge advocate performing such 
duties to place interests other than his client‘s at the forefront. It would similarly comprise 
professional misconduct for those in the defense attorney‘s chain of command to attempt to 
limit his or her zealous representation.‖). 
146 5 U.S.C. 1501 (explaining that government employees are subject to certain free speech 
limitations under the Hatch Act). 
147 See, e.g., Winthrop v. Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Dist Ct, Alexandria (filed 
2009). The author served as counsel for former CIA employee who opted to abruptly quit his 
post. Citing breach of contract, the CIA unsuccessfully pursued damages in the form of recu-
peration of moving expenses, pay, and threats of negative reporting to the credit bureaus. For 
more information, see Complaint, id., available at http://cryptome.org/cia-screws-gw.pdf; 
Exhibit 2, id, available at http://cryptome.quintessenz.at/mirror/cia-screws-gw2.pdf; Jeff 
Stein, Lawyers: Punish CIA Counsel for Deception, CQ-ROLL CALL BLOG, Aug. 17, 2009, 
http://blogs.cqrollcall.com/spytalk/2009/08/lawyers-punish-cia-counsel-for.html.  
148 See generally U.S. DEP‘T OF ARMY, REG. 350-100, OFFICER ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE 
OBLIGATIONS (Aug. 10, 2009) (citing statutory service obligations). 
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nificantly, this obligation is directly related to servicemembers‘ jurisdiction 
under the UCMJ.149 In short, civilians may face financial repercussions for 
simply leaving, but servicemembers can lose their freedom. 
Certainly, this is not to suggest that doctors and lawyers are not free 
to leave. Once the obligations are complete, these servicemembers generally 
can seek to resign from the military.150 Morris Davis, former chief prosecu-
tor for the Office of Military Commissions, did precisely this when faced 
with personal disagreements with the Guántanamo Bay system.151 But what 
about those who still hold service obligations? 
In the context of the military commissions, there have been cases 
where prosecutors have made in-house requests to be removed from cases 
for various reasons.152 Also, like the prosecution side, defense counsel typi-
cally volunteers to serve in the Guántanamo Bay system.153 Of course, the 
public statements and technical UCMJ violations continued. 
As mentioned above, military doctors and lawyers should seek 
counsel prior to acting on their personal concerns.154 This includes legal and 
ethics advice from a knowledgeable and confidential source from both the 
military law side and the licensing authority.155 While it may sound like 
common sense, Diaz is a good example of an otherwise competent and in-
telligent professional who simply acted without credible deliberation.156 In 
addition, upon sentencing in the Lakin case, the doctor folded and ultimate-
ly claimed that he initially consulted with an attorney incapable of providing 
sound advice.157 Although Lakin was certainly operating to gain mass expo-
sure to his political issue, proper legal advice may have led him to act more 
appropriately (and legally).158 
On a grander scale, the Military Whistleblower Protection Act out-
lines additional options for servicemembers to report perceived wrong-
  
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Carol J. Williams, War Court Prosecutor Quits Post, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2007; See also 
David Zucchino, Retired Colonel Fights Library of Congress Over Firing, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
6, 2010 (Interestingly, Davis was ultimately fired from his follow-on civilian job at the Li-
brary of Congress after issuing op-ed pieces in various news publications where he continued 
to criticize the military commissions system.). 
152 The nature of these instances is deemed confidential. 
153 DEP‘T OF DEFENSE, supra note 8, at ch. 9(1)(a)(12) (―The Chief Defense Counsel shall 
ensure that all detailed defense counsel and civilian defense counsel who are to perform 
duties in relation to a military commission have taken an oath to perform their duties faithful-
ly‖).  
154 Yaroshefsky, supra note 3, at 579.  
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Gresko, supra note 45. 
158 Id. 
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doing.159 While this will not be of much use for the politically anti-war pro-
fessional such as Huet-Vaughn, the whistleblower law can be a powerful 
tool when it comes to specific concerns. For example, Diaz‘s actions 
stemmed from a belief that his superiors were acting in direct violation to 
Supreme Court decisions. He could have formulated an official and detailed 
complaint to not only his command, but also the investigative general and 
any member of Congress.160 By going all three routes, Diaz would have 
created a lawful trifecta of his own to investigate his claims. Doctors also 
could use this as a mechanism to maintain their medical neutrality and ethi-
cal requirements by using the military‘s internal and statutory investigative 
system.161 
Along these lines, one element of the military whistleblower law 
that needs to be improved relates to legal counsel. Currently, the military 
legal system is not designed to provide potential whistleblowers with a con-
fidential attorney.162 This poses as a problem because servicemembers, to 
include military doctors and even other lawyers, can benefit from establish-
ing an attorney-client relationship in order to properly asses all options. 
Coupled with the fact that the Military Whistleblower Protection Act is very 
nuanced in terms of how to facilitate the process, servicemembers are at a 
disadvantage under the current system.163 
Typically, servicemembers have two options when seeking legal 
advice. One is the trial defense services.164 These defense counsels are pro-
vided a substantial degree of independence from the rest of the military.165 
The obvious reason is that since these lawyers serve as defense counsel, 
they can establish attorney-client relationships. However, the mandate for 
military defense attorneys is that they can generally only get involved when 
a servicemember is charged, under investigation, or facing some other form 
of adverse criminal or administrative action.166 As a result, a potential whis-
  
159 Military Whistleblower Protection Act, supra note 17. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. (failing to address the need to assign legal counsel to potential whistleblowers in the 
military). 
163 Id. 
164 See, e.g., U.S. Army Trial Defense Service (USATDS), JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL‘S 
CORPS, U.S. ARMY, https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/85257372006BBDCC/(JAGCNETDocID) 
/HOME?OPENDOCUMENT (last visited Mar. 13, 2011); see also JAG - Trial Defense 
Services: About Us, OREGON.GOV, http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/JAG/about_us.shtml (last 
visited Mar.13, 2011) (presenting Trial Defense Services mission statement). 
165 DEP‘T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 27–100, LEGAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS § 2.5 
(2000) available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/27-100/ 
chap2.htm (discussing the independence of Trial Defense Services). 
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tleblower seeking confidential advice or assistance should technically be 
turned away.167 
The second option is what is typically referred to as a legal assis-
tance attorney.168 These military lawyers are available to assist and counsel 
servicemembers on issues ranging from debt collection to estate planning. 
Due to their wide-range of counseling ability, legal assistance lawyers seem 
to be the obvious option for a whistleblower consultation. The problem is 
that legal assistance is not technically confidential. Unlike defense counsel, 
the mandate for legal assistance attorneys is to represent the servicememb-
ers as lawyers for the military.169 In other words, the client for ethical and 
bar purposes is the military, and not the servicemember.  
The end result is typically that legal assistance lawyers will provide 
the statutory rundown of the whistleblower law. The servicemember will 
then be left to his or her own auspices to file a report with the command, 
member of Congress, or investigator general.170 But compare this to federal 
whistleblower recommendations where it is highly suggested that civilians 
hire an attorney to assist. This is in part to help navigate the many pitfalls 
that can arise during a whistleblower investigation. While servicemembers 
are free to hire a civilian attorney, the unique military system is often a 
rough place for non-military lawyers. 
To this end, it is recommended that military regulations be amended 
to afford legal assistance lawyers with the ability to establish attorney-client 
relationships with potential whistleblowers. In addition, the legal assistance 
lawyers also should be permitted to represent the military whistleblower for 
the duration of the investigation. In this manner, servicemembers will have 
a conduit to assist in all facets of the process when a perceived act of 
wrongdoing is taking place. In regard to those developing a ―crisis of con-
science,‖ providing them with a confidential lawyer who can be there for 
the duration also could properly establish the needed relationship to prevent 
a servicemember from taking the personal beliefs too far. Military doctors 
  
166 Trial Defense Service, FORT IRWIN, http://www.irwin.army.mil/cmd_staff/ 
NTCcommand/OSJA/Pages/TrialDefenseService.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2011) (present-
ing the Trial Defense Service Mandate); see also Staff Judge Advocate, FORT MEADE, 
http://www.ftmeade.army.mil/pages/sja/sja.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
167 William E. Brown, Whistleblower Protection for Military Members, 2008 ARMY L. 58, 
59 (stating that trial defense services are provided only where the ―Soldier‘s alleged reprisal 
complaint is related to pending or recently completed criminal proceedings‖). 
168 DEP‘T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION NO. 27–3, LEGAL SERVICES: THE ARMY LEGAL 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (1996) available at http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/R27_3.PDF. 
169 Id. 
170 See Brown, supra note 167 (But compare to legal assistance with complaints from ser-
vicemembers alleging wrongdoing against them by their commander, also known as Article 
138 complaints. In Article 138 complaints, legal assistance attorneys can draft memoranda 
on behalf of the servicemember, but still cannot represent the servicemember.). 
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and lawyers can use this assistance along with professional guidance from 
their licensing jurisdictions, ultimately to develop an intelligent, ethical, and 
legal plan of action. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Military expression pertains to the free speech rights and actions of 
servicemembers. Unlike most civilians, servicemembers are subject to rules 
and regulations that somewhat limit how they can publicly espouse their 
personal views. Most of these men and women in uniform must reconcile 
their personal beliefs with their duties as a member of the military. This is 
particularly true with individuals who find themselves personally opposed 
to various policies or practices of their employer. 
The situation revolving around these ―crisis of conscience‖ become 
more complex when it relates to licensed professionals in uniform. The rea-
son is that doctors and lawyers fall into a veritable military expression tri-
fecta due to the added element pertaining to their ethical licensing require-
ments coupled with personal beliefs and military expression limitations. 
There have been a number of cases in the United States and Britain 
where licensed military physicians opted to violate their military duties in 
the name of personal beliefs publicly. In the process, the doctors put their 
professional licenses on the line. Moreover, a significant amount of military 
lawyers participating in the Guántanamo Bay detainee process also have 
technically violated military rules governed by the UCMJ. In many ways, 
the political environment surrounding GTMO has created a legal scenario 
that perpetuates politics on the part of some participants.  
The bottom line for professionals seeking to reconcile this military 
expression trifecta is that they should first consult with neutral counsel. 
From there, the professional can gage the next course of action that con-
forms to military rules and ethical guidelines, as well as personal con-
science. The system does permit various methods for reporting potential 
violations, as well as means to protect ones career. To act solely on personal 
conscience without working through the system to remedy the issue is in 
many ways reckless and dangerous. 
 
